Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost-benefit analysis, Mind & Language (forthcoming). [link]
According to evidentialist views, credence in a proposition p should be proportional to the degree of evidential support that one has in favor of p. However, empirical evidence suggests that our credences are systematically sensitive to practical factors. In this article, I provide a cost–benefit analysis of credences' practical sensitivity. The upshot of this analysis is that credences sensitive to practical factors fare better than practically insensitive ones along several dimensions. All things considered, our credences should be sensitive to practical factors.
Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory? (with Davide Fassio), Synthese (2021). [link]
In this paper, we argue that knowledge-based decision theory (KBDT) is not well motivated. In particular, we argue that it inherits all the same kinds of problems as alternative subjective and objective decision theories, but doesn’t retain any of the respective advantages. Moreover, unlike other knowledge-action principles, KBDT cannot fully explain the intuitive connections between knowledge and rational action.
Credal sensitivism: threshold vs. credence-one, Inquiry (forthcoming). [link]
Credal sensitivism holds that the context-sensitivity of belief is due to the context-sensitivity of degrees of belief or credence. It comes in two variants: while credence-one sensitivism (COS) holds that maximal confidence (credence one) is necessary for belief, threshold credal sensitivism (TCS) holds that belief consists in having credence above some threshold, where this threshold doesn’t require maximal confidence. In this paper, I argue that COS has difficulties in accounting for three important features about belief and TCS can easily avoid these problems. I also consider an alleged advantage of COS over TCS. The conclusion is that TCS is the most plausible version of credal sensitivitism.
Self-deception and pragmatic encroachment: a dilemma for epistemic rationality, Ratio (2021). [link]
I argue that some cases of self-deception satisfy what pragmatic encroachment considers sufficient conditions for epistemic rationality. As a result, we face the following dilemma: either we revise the received view about self-deception or we deny pragmatic encroachment on epistemic rationality. I suggest that the dilemma can be solved if we pay close attention to the distinction between ideal and bounded rationality.
Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence (with Davide Fassio), Theoria (2020). [link]
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that, in addition to playing a decisive role in rationalizing outright belief, non-statistical evidence also plays a preponderant role in rationalizing credence. More precisely, when both types of evidence are present in a context, non-statistical evidence should receive a heavier weight than statistical evidence in determining rational credence. Second, based on this result, we argue that a modified version of the Rational Threshold View can avoid the problem of statistical evidence. We conclude by suggesting a possible explanation of the varying sensitivity to different types of evidence for belief and credence based on the respective aims of these attitudes.
Credal pragmatism, Philosophical Studies (2019). [link]
I compare two versions of doxastic pragmatism, credal pragmatism and threshold pragmatism and argue that the former view better accommodates a range of intuitive and empirical data. I also consider the issue of whether our doxastic attitudes’ sensitivity to practical factors can be considered rational, and if yes, in what sense.
Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-stakes Cases, Episteme (2019). [link]
One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in high stakes when the target propositions seem to be inappropriate premises for practical reasoning. According to an account suggested by Williamson, our intuitive judgments are erroneous due to an alleged failure to acknowledge the distinction between first-order and higher-order knowledge. In this paper, I provide three objections to Williamson’s account.
Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute? (with Mikkel Gerken and Stephen Ryan). In Ichikawa, J. (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Contextualism. (2017). [link]
In this entry, we provide an overview of some of the methodological debates surrounding contextualism and consider whether they are, in effect, based on an underlying methodological dispute.
Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa), Synthese (2017). [link]
The knowledge norm of practical reasoning can be formulated as a bi-conditional: it is appropriate to treat p as a reason for acting if and only if you know that p. This paper gives counter-examples of both directions of any such bi-conditional. To the left-to-right direction: scientists can appropriately treat as reasons for action propositions of a theory they believe to be false but good approximations to the truth for present purposes. Cases based on a variant of Pascal’s Wager and actions performed by a skeptic also illustrate the point. To the right-to-left direction: in certain circumstances, it can be unreasonable for a scientist to reason from propositions of a theory she knows to be true.
默认假定, 枢轴承诺与闭合原则 (Default Assumption, Hinge Commitment and the Closure Principle), 自然辩证法通讯(Journal of Dialectics of Nature) (2020). [link] This paper focuses on a potential problem with Sosa’s theory of default assumption, viz., the alleged incompatibility of this theory with the closure principle. I argue that default assumption should be classified as acceptance and hence as a non-doxastic propositional attitude. In this way Sosa’s theory can avoid potential problems.
Beebe, J. (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2015, 29 (1): 101-105. [link, pdf]